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Abstract. We investigate the credibility of nonbinding preplay statements about co-
operative behavior, using data from a high-stakes TV game show inwhich contestants play
a variant on the classic Prisoner’s Dilemma. We depart from the conventional binary
approach of classifying statements as promises or not, and propose a more fine-grained
two-by-two typology inspired by the idea that lying aversion leads defectors to prefer
statements that are malleable to ex-post interpretation as truths. Our empirical analysis
shows that statements that carry an element of conditionality or implicitness are associated
with a lower likelihood of cooperation, and confirms thatmalleability is a good criterion for
judging the credibility of cheap talk.
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1. Introduction
In many social and economic interactions, people care
about the behavior of others. For instance, in fiduciary
business relationships, principals are concerned about
the risk of being exploited by their agents, and in
romantic relationships, lovers considering moving in
together may worry about the eventual division of
household labor. Often the information that is available
for predicting what others will do is limited to non-
binding and nonverifiable communication.
The traditional assumption in economics is that lying
is costless. Under that assumption, cheap talk is not
informative when interests are insufficiently aligned
(Farrell and Rabin 1996). This assumption, however,
contradicts the view held in social psychology that for
most people lying entails an unpleasant and therefore
costly experience (Ekman 2001, Vrij 2008). An extensive
body of research on cues to deception critically builds
on the premise that lying and truth-telling generate
distinct emotional states (Zuckerman et al. 1981,
DePaulo et al. 2003, Sporer and Schwandt 2007).
Economic experiments indeed reject the notion that
people are unscrupulous liars and show that cheap talk
can be informative in the absence of aligned interests
(Gneezy 2005, Lundquist et al. 2009, Serra-Garcia et al.
2011, Erat and Gneezy 2012, Cappelen et al. 2013,
Abeler et al. 2014).
There are a number of explanations for the aversion
to lying. Commitment-based explanations posit that
people simply have an intrinsic preference for keeping
their word (Ellingsen and Johannesson 2004, Vanberg
2008). Such a preference is also in line with self-concept
maintenance theory, where people like to view them-
selves as honest and are averse to negatively updating
their self-concept after a dishonest act (Mazar et al.
2008). Alternatively, expectation-based accounts state
that people dislike lying because they experience guilt
if they do not live up to others’ expectations (Charness
and Dufwenberg 2006, 2010; Battigalli et al. 2013;
Ederer and Stremitzer 2017). People may also refrain
from lying simply because of fear of being caught,
which could harm their reputation as an honest and
reliable person.1
The literature on lying aversion and the predictive
power of promises has largely concentrated on binary—to
lie or not to lie—stylized choice contexts. The present
paper extends this literature with a more fine-grained
conceptual framework. When talk is free-form, as in
most real-life situations, the set of possible deceptive
statements is richer: instead of outright lying, people
can choose to deceive by omitting, obfuscating, or
stretching the truth. This wider choice set is poten-
tially important, because some types of deceptionmay
be more aversive to liars than other types and thus
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more likely to be avoided. As an implication of this
avoidance, some statements will be more indicative
of cooperative behavior than others. Although some
papers do study the predictive power of statements in
free-form communication, they typically distinguish
only one particular type of message—a promise—so
that cheap talk is effectively still analyzed in a binary
framework (Vanberg 2008, van den Assem et al. 2012).
In the present paper we empirically address the
question whether distinguishing between different
types of statements adds to the predictive power of
cheap talk, using a high-stakes noncooperative game
with free-form communication. In each episode of the
British TV show Golden Balls, two contestants play
a variant on the Prisoner’s Dilemma where they si-
multaneously decide to either split (cooperate) or steal
(defect) a sum of money that on average exceeds
£13,000. Prior to their decisions, they engage in a brief
free-form discussion about the choice at hand. During
the talk, they typically exchange multiple statements,
most of which involve giving or eliciting some type of
signal that the intended decision is to split.2
We hypothesize that lies are less costly if they are
malleable to interpretation as truths and that people
who defect prefer statements that allow them to
deny—to themselves or to others—that they are lying.
Such statements arguably entail weaker commitment,
weaker feelings of disappointing the other, and lower
reputation costs. People who cooperate have no reason
to resort to malleable statements. If defectors avoid
unmalleable statements and cooperators do not, mal-
leability becomes a criterion for judging the credibility
of cheap talk.
Earlier studies providing support for the idea that
people want to avoid blatant lies when they try to
mislead others include Serra-Garcia et al. (2011) and
Khalmetski et al. (2017). Serra-Garcia et al. find that
people rather deceive by means of a vague message
that captures the truth. Khalmetski et al. demonstrate
that people often engage in evasive lying by pretending
not to know the truth. Furthermore, a growing line of
work shows that people are more willing to cheat if the
context provides some leeway to justify their behavior
(Schweitzer and Hsee 2002, Mazar et al. 2008, Shalvi
et al. 2011, Pittarello et al. 2015).3
An implication of our malleability hypothesis is that
unmalleable statements or “promises” become less pre-
dictive of cooperation when defectors cannot resort to
more malleable statements. Empirical work by Charness
and Dufwenberg (2006, 2010) on free-form versus re-
stricted communication and by Belot et al. (2010) on vol-
untary versus elicited promises supports this prediction.
We propose a typology of statements in terms of their
malleability to interpretation as truths. This typology
classifies contestants’ statements according to two di-
mensions. First, it discriminates between statements
that explicitly express that the contestant will choose
split and statements that only implicitly signal that she
will do so. Second, it discriminates between uncondi-
tional statements and statements that carry an element
of conditionality on the opponent’s split or steal deci-
sion. We argue that explicit and unconditional state-
ments are less malleable than implicit or conditional
statements. Consider, for example, the statement “I will
split.” This statement is both explicit and unconditional,
and for a defector who uses it, it will be hard if not
impossible to deny that she has deceived her opponent.
The statement “I came here to split” similarly has no
element of conditionality, but this one is at best only an
implicit promise to split: it is silent about the contestant’s
current intention andmeanwhile shemay have changed
her mind. The explicit statement “I will split if you split”
is clearly conditional on the opponent’s choice, and
a decision to steal can be justified by a belief that the
opponent steals.
Our empirical analysis confirms that malleability is
a good criterion for judging the credibility of cheap
talk. Explicit unconditional statements are indicative of
a relatively high likelihood of cooperation, whereas
statements that carry an element of conditionality or
implicitness are associated with a moderate likelihood.
Contestants who make statements that are both con-
ditional and implicit and contestants who do not make
any statements related to their choice display the
lowest rate of cooperation. In spite of this predictive
power and in spite of the evidence in the literature that
people have conditionally cooperative preferences
(Fischbacher et al. 2001, Frey and Meier 2004), we find
no evidence that contestants condition their choice on
their opponents’ statements.
2. Game Show and Data
2.1. Golden Balls
Golden Balls was broadcast on British television be-
tween June 2007 and December 2009. We analyze the
game played in the fourth and final round of every
episode. In this final, two contestants play a game
that resembles the classic Prisoner’s Dilemma. What
follows here is a brief description of Golden Balls. For
a more extensive discussion we refer to van den Assem
et al. (2012).
The show begins with four contestants who have not
met before. In the first two rounds, the four (round 1) or
remaining three (round 2) contestants all receive a set of
golden balls. Each ball carries a specific value, which in
the end may contribute to the final jackpot. The con-
tents of some balls are visible to everyone, whereas the
contents of the other balls are known to the contestant
only. Contestants have to make claims about the
contents of their hidden balls, after which they have an
open discussion and then cast votes against each other.
The player who receives most votes is eliminated from
Turmunkh, van den Assem, and van Dolder: Malleable Lies
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the game, together with her golden balls. In the third
round, the two remaining contestants determine the
jackpot through a random draw from the remaining
balls.
In the fourth and final round, each of the two finalists
is presented with two golden balls, one with the word
“split” and the other with the word “steal” written
inside. They simultaneously have to choose either the
split or the steal ball. If both decide to split, they split
the jackpot equally. If one decides to split while the
other decides to steal, the one who steals receives the
entire jackpot and the one who splits goes home with
nothing. If both decide to steal, both go home with
nothing. Following Rapoport’s (1988) terminology, the
choice problem can be labeled as a “weak” form of the
Prisoner’s Dilemma because defection does not strictly
dominate cooperation. Prior to their decisions, the
two contestants engage in a brief free-form discussion
in which they can try to persuade one another to
cooperate.
2.2. Van den Assem et al. (2012)
Golden Balls has previously been studied by van den
Assem et al. (2012). The analyses in the present paper
control for the determinants of cooperation identi-
fied in that study. Here we summarize the earlier
findings.
Young males are less cooperative than young fe-
males. This gender difference reverses for older con-
testants because older men are much more cooperative
than younger men. In addition, there is some evidence
that white and higher educated contestants are more
likely to cooperate. Distinguishing between contestants
from urban and rural areas and between students and
nonstudents adds little explanatory power.
Cooperation is largely insensitive to the size of the
jackpot: contestants cooperate about half the time,
irrespective of whether they are playing for a few
thousand or a hundred thousand pounds. A major
exception is that the rate of cooperation is relatively
high, about 70%, when there are only a few hundred
pounds at stake.
During the show’s first seasons—when few or no
episodes had been broadcast and contestants were not
yet able to accurately estimate what they could expect
to win in the show—the choices of contestants were
strongly influenced by the maximum potential jackpot
prior to the final. Before players determine the jackpot
by randomly drawing five golden balls, a great deal of
attention is given to this maximum. The higher this
maximum is—and the smaller the actual jackpot thus
appears to be—the greater the likelihood that players
cooperate. This effect diminishes with the number of
televised episodes, possibly because players learned
what to expect. These results suggest that contestants
assess the stakes in relative terms.
Contestants who misrepresented the contents of their
hidden balls in the first two rounds of the game do not
cooperate more or less than those who have been honest
throughout, and neither do their opponents. Consistent
with the notion that people have a preference for reci-
procity, contestants are less likely to cooperate with
opponents who have tried to vote them off the show
during the first two rounds.
The prior study also analyzes the predictive power of
promises in a binary framework and reports that those
who make an unambiguous promise are much more
likely to cooperate. Unambiguous promises resemble
what we call explicit unconditional statements in the
present paper, with the important difference that we
now ignore statements that have no meaning on their
own, such as short utterances in response to remarks
or questions by the opponent (e.g., “Yeah,” “No,” and
“Absolutely”; see Section 2.4).4
Last, van den Assem et al. (2012) find little evidence
that contestants’ propensity to cooperate depends on
the likelihood that their opponent cooperates: players
do not seem to condition on their opponent’s promise
or background characteristics, despite their predic-
tive power.
2.3. Typology of Preplay Communication
Prior to their split or steal decisions, the two finalists
engage in a brief free-form talk about the choice at
hand. During this talk, they typically exchange multiple
statements through which they try to signal that they
will choose split or to get assurances that the opponent
will do so. Owing to the free-form nature, there is a rich
set of statements that contestants can make. In this sub-
section, we introduce the typology of statements that
is central in the present paper.
We categorize the different statements that signal
splitting according to how malleable they are. Con-
testants who are about to steal normally try to conceal
this intention. On the basis of the notion that lies that
are more malleable to interpretation as truths entail
lower lying costs, we expect that stealing contestants
will prefer malleable statements over unmalleable
statements. Contestants who are about to split face no
lying costs and thus have no need for such substitu-
tion. As a consequence, the malleability of the state-
ments that contestants make will predict cooperative
behavior.
Our typology distinguishes between explicit and
implicit statements, and between unconditional and
conditional statements. These distinctions lead to four
different categories (Figure 1).
Explicit unconditional statements such as “I will
split” are completely unmalleable. Consider, in con-
trast, the statement “I want to split.” The latter does not
explicitly express that the contestant will choose split,
but signals this by expressing a preference to do so.
Turmunkh, van den Assem, and van Dolder: Malleable Lies
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Strictly speaking, the desire to split can be sincere even
if the action is to the contrary, and therefore we argue
that this statement is more malleable than “I will split.”
In a similar way, a contestant can signal that she will
split without stating so explicitly by referring to her
character (“It is not in my nature to steal”), by refer-
ring to a past intention (“I came here to split”), by
expressing awareness or worry that viewers will dis-
approve stealing (“If I stole off you, the audiencewould
lynch me”), by indicating that half the jackpot is good
enough or a lot of money (“I would be delighted to
go home with half the jackpot”), or by urging
the opponent to have trust (“You can trust me”). All
these types of implicit unconditional statements allow
a contestant to deny that she has lied if she steals.
Next, compare the explicit unconditional statement
“I will split” with the statements “I will split if you
split” and “We will split together.” All are explicit
about what the contestant will do, but the latter two
carry an element of conditionality on the opponent’s
split or steal decision: through an if-clause or because it
refers to the coordinated action. In the latter case the
element of conditionality is not as literally present as it
is in the former, but in both cases the contestant is
connecting her own choice with that of her opponent.
The conditionality in explicit conditional statements
allows a stealing contestant to deny that she has lied, as
she can always argue that she did not believe that her
opponent was about to split.5
The fourth category comprises statements that are
both implicit and conditional. These two properties
make it easy to deny lying if one decides to steal.
Examples include “I think we should split,” “I want us
to split,” and “I am willing to choose split if you split.”
Our typology only considers statements that signal
that the contestant will choose split. All other things
contestants say are considered as empty talk. Empty
talk includes questions and pleas directed at the op-
ponent (“Will you split?” or “I hope you will split”),
remarks about the previous rounds (“I did not lie a
single time” or “I brought you to the final”), and many
other types of idle remarks (“This is a lot of money,”
“You seem like a nice person,” or “We have come so
far”). Additional examples of statements and expla-
nations of how they are coded are in the appendix.
2.4. Coding Rules
Coding free-form communication into the types de-
scribed above is not straightforward. People stumble
over words, jump from one topic to the next, and use
short and incomplete phrases that are difficult to in-
terpret. We use the following strict set of coding rules.
Figure 1. Typology of Statements
Notes. The typology classifies all statements that signal that the contestant will cooperate into one of four categories on the basis of whether they
explicitly or only implicitly say that the individual will cooperate, and on the basis of whether they carry an element of conditionality on the
opponent’s split or steal decision. Implicit unconditional statements are divided into six different subcategories.
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First, we require that statements have a meaning on
their own. This implies that we ignore short utterances
such as “Yeah,” “No,” and “Absolutely.” Short utter-
ances are often preceded or followed by complete
statements that elaborate their meaning. Complete
statements are coded, so in those cases no information
is lost. Furthermore, many short utterances constitute
responses to remarks or questions by the opponent. In
a conversation between two people, people are more or
less expected to respond in a particular way to what the
other has said or asked. If a contestant chooses not to
back up her short responsewith a longer statement, this
can be seen as an indication that the short reply was
forced out of her. In this sense, our analysis thus only
considers statements that contestants have made
voluntarily.6
Second, we count consecutive statements of the same
type as one statement if they are not interspersed with
other statements. Contestants frequently repeat what
they say or elaborate on it (“It is not in my nature
to steal. I just could not do that.”). Such repetitions
and elaborations are hard to count and separate, and
combined they represent a single message. When
multiple statements of the same type are interspersed
with other statements, we do treat them separately, as
this indicates that the contestant consciously decided to
make the same point again.
Third, if the stand-alone interpretation of the verb “to
split” is ambiguous, we assume that it refers to the
contestant’s action of choosing the split ball. Formally,
the verb can refer both to the action of a single con-
testant who chooses the split ball and to the outcome of
two contestants actually sharing the jackpot. Often the
exact meaning is clear, but for some statements, such as
“I want to split,” one can argue both ways. Because the
more commonmeaning in the show is the unilateral act
of picking the split ball (the game of interest is even
called “Split or Steal?”), we use this meaning as the
default interpretation. For consistency, we treat the
synonym “to share” analogously.
Fourth, just like “you and I” is equal to “we,” we
interpret the combination of a statement referring to
“you” (the opponent) and a similar statement referring
to “I” (the player herself) as one statement referring
to “we.” For example, “You will split, I will split” is
considered equivalent to “we will split.” The order of
the two statements does not matter, but we do require
that they directly follow each other.
Last, if a statement contains a pronoun such as “it,”
“this,” or “that” and if the noun to which it refers
is clear from the context, then we interpret such a
statement as if that noun replaces the pronoun.
2.5. Data and Descriptive Statistics
The data set used for this study covers 284 episodes.
Recordings were originally provided by Endemol’s
local production company Endemol UK for the pur-
pose of the study by van den Assem et al. (2012). Of the
288 episodes that aired in total, one could not be located
by the producer and is therefore missing. We excluded
three more episodes. In one of these, a finalist an-
nounces that he will pick the steal ball, and promises to
reward his opponent with half of the money after the
show if the opponent splits. This exceptional case is
incompatible with our coding framework.7 In the two
other excluded episodes, most of what contestants say
is clearly meant ironically, probably owing to the small
jackpot sizes (£3.00 and £3.65).
The 568 contestants in our sample are playing for
a jackpot that ranges between a few pounds and
about one hundred thousand pounds, and averages
£13,510 (median: £4,325). Approximately half (52%)
cooperate. The average age is 37 years (median: 34
years), and there are about as many males (46%) as
females (54%).
To construct our communication data, we first
transcribed all conversations. For each contestant, the
three authors then independently counted the number
of statements in every category. Differences were dis-
cussed until consensus was reached.
Table 1 shows the frequency distribution of the
number of statements made by contestants for each
statement category. Over one-third of the contestants
(38%) made at least one explicit unconditional state-
ment (“I will split”). More than half (56%) made one
or more implicit unconditional statements. The most
frequent type of implicit unconditional statement re-
lates to the jackpot size (25%) or refers to a preference
(19%) or past intention (13%). Relatively few contes-
tants (7%) made an explicit conditional statement (“I
will split if you split” or “We will split together”), and
about one-third (34%)made an implicit conditional one
(“I amwilling to choose split if you split” or “I think we
should split”).8 The use of multiple statements from the
same category is relatively rare. About one in six (17%)
limited themselves to empty talk.
3. Analyses and Results
3.1. Preliminary Analysis
For a first glimpse of the association between the
malleability of statements and cooperation, we con-
sider the rates of cooperation after different statement
types. Figure 2(a) shows the cooperation rate condi-
tional on whether a contestant made a statement from
a particular category, regardless of repetitions and
regardless of whether she also made statements from
any other category. In line with our malleability hy-
pothesis, the cooperation rate is highest for contestants
who made an explicit unconditional statement (67%).
The rate is lower after the more malleable implicit
unconditional (58%) and explicit conditional (59%)
statements. Contestants who made a statement that is
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both implicit and conditional cooperate even less (49%).
Last, contestants who used none of the four types have
the lowest propensity to split (31%).
Contestants normally make more than one state-
ment. Figure 2(b) shows that there are no clear in-
cremental effects of one or more additional statements
from the same category, suggesting that the propensity
to split is similar for contestants who made a particular
statement only once and for those who made the same
statement multiple times.
Many make statements from different categories,
and the malleability of a set of statements may be fully
driven by the strongest statement alone. For example,
a contestant who explicitly promises her opponent that
she will split arguably does not make her overall
message more or less malleable by adding that viewers
would lynch her if she steals.
Figures 2(c) and 2(d) indicate how cooperation de-
pends on a contestant’s strongest statement. We use
two different orderings, because there is no compelling
a priori reason to consider implicit unconditional
statements more or less malleable than explicit condi-
tional statements. Figure 2(c) assumes that implicit
unconditional statements are stronger than explicit
conditional statements, and Figure 2(d) assumes the
reverse. The patterns are consistent with the mallea-
bility hypothesis. The cooperation rate is highest when
the strongest statement was of the explicit uncondi-
tional type (67%), low when the strongest was both
implicit and conditional (40%), and lowest when the
contestant limited herself to empty talk (31%). Under
both orderings, contestants whose strongest state-
ment was implicit unconditional or explicit condi-
tional show intermediate cooperation rates. The
averages suggest that explicit conditional statements
are stronger than implicit unconditional ones [as as-
sumed in Figure 2(d)].
3.2. Regression Analysis
The comparisons of cooperation rates provide only
crude insights into the predictive power of commu-
nication, because they neither take into account the
differences in contestant and game characteristics nor
the use of multiple statements by the same contestant.
In this section, we therefore turn to multivariate Logit
regressions. The dependent variable is the contestant’s
decision, taking the value of one for “split” and zero
for “steal.” The main regressors are variables for the
different statement categories. The set of control
variables is identical to the set of variables in model 6
of van den Assem et al. (2012, p. 13). It includes de-
mographic information on age, gender, race, place of
residence, and education, and game characteristics
describing the jackpot, how many times the show
Table 1. Frequency Distributions of the Number of Statements
Frequency of statements
Statement category 0 >0 1 2 3 >3
Explicit unconditional 353 215 146 54 11 4
(62.1%) (37.9%) (25.7%) (9.5%) (1.9%) (0.7%)
Implicit unconditional 250 318 184 95 26 13
(44.0%) (56.0%) (32.4%) (16.7%) (4.6%) (2.3%)
Character 532 36 31 5 0 0
(93.7%) (6.3%) (5.5%) (0.9%) (0.0%) (0.0%)
Past intention 493 75 63 11 0 1
(86.8%) (13.2%) (11.1%) (1.9%) (0.0%) (0.2%)
Viewers 534 34 31 3 0 0
(94%) (6.0%) (5.5%) (0.5%) (0.0%) (0.0%)
Preference 462 106 90 12 4 0
(81.3%) (18.7%) (15.8%) (2.1%) (0.7%) (0.0%)
Trust 516 52 46 6 0 0
(90.8%) (9.2%) (8.1%) (1.1%) (0.0%) (0.0%)
Money 427 141 123 18 0 0
(75.2%) (24.8%) (21.7%) (3.2%) (0.0%) (0.0%)
Explicit conditional 529 39 35 3 1 0
(93.1%) (6.9%) (6.2%) (0.5%) (0.2%) (0.0%)
Implicit conditional 376 192 153 32 7 0
(66.2%) (33.8%) (26.9%) (5.6%) (1.2%) (0.0%)
Overall 96 472 162 150 76 84
(16.9%) (83.1%) (28.5%) (26.4%) (13.4%) (14.8%)
Notes. This table shows the frequency distribution of the number of statements made by contestants for
each statement category and for the subcategories of implicit unconditional statements. Percentages of
the total pool of 568 contestants are in parentheses.
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had been aired prior to recording and whether the
opponent has tried to vote the participant off the
show. We follow the common approach of reporting
average marginal effects (with the corresponding
standard errors and significance levels) and correct
the standard errors for clustering at the episode level
(Wooldridge 2003).
In Table 2, Models 1 and 2 use indicator variables
for the statements and ignore possible repetitions.
Model 2 includes the full set of controls and shows
that a contestant who made one or more explicit
unconditional statements is 25 percentage points more
likely to choose split than a contestant who did not
make any such statements (p < 0.001). Implicit un-
conditional statements also predict a higher likelihood
of splitting, but to a lesser extent: the average marginal
effect is 12 percentage points (p = 0.002). Explicit
conditional and implicit conditional statements are
insignificant predictors of behavior.
The marginal effects of the four statement types
differ significantly (Wald Chi2(3) = 26.58, p < 0.001),
and rank in line with the malleability hypothesis.
Figure 2. Cooperation Across Statement Categories
Notes. Panel (a) displays the percentage of cooperators for all contestants whomade at least one statement from a particular category and for all
contestants who limited themselves to empty talk. Panel (b) displays the differences in the percentages of cooperators between contestants who
made at least two statements from a particular category and those who made only one. Panels (c) and (d) display the percentage of cooperators
for all contestants whose strongest statement belongs to a particular category, with panel (c) assuming that implicit unconditional statements are
stronger than explicit conditional statements, and panel (d) assuming the reverse. The number of contestants is at the bottom of each bar. Error
bars depict standard errors around the mean.
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Pairwise comparisons provide further evidence for the
malleability hypothesis: the marginal effect of explicit
unconditional statements is significantly larger than that
of each of the three more malleable types of statements
(all Wald Chi2(1) > 4.89, all one-sided p < 0.013), and
the marginal effect of implicit unconditional statements
is larger than that of implicit conditional statements
(Wald Chi2(1) = 5.80; one-sided p = 0.008). There is no
significant difference between explicit conditional and
implicit conditional statements (Wald Chi2(1) = 0.18;
one-sided p = 0.335). The malleability hypothesis makes
no prediction regarding the relative strength of implicit
unconditional and explicit conditional statements; sta-
tistically the marginal effects of these statement types
do not differ (Wald Chi2(1) = 1.21; p = 0.272).
Existing research into the credibility of cheap talk
typically uses a binary framework where people either
make a promise or not. When promises are equated to
explicit unconditional statements, implicit statements
and conditional statements do not exist by design or are
categorized as empty talk. Our more fine-grained two-
by-two typology improves the explanatory power over
a model that only considers explicit unconditional
statements and pools the other three types with empty
talk: the null hypothesis that the coefficients for implicit
unconditional, explicit conditional and implicit con-
ditional statements are jointly equal to zero can be
rejected (Wald Chi2(3) = 9.19, p = 0.027). Adding the
three weaker statement types to the model with explicit
unconditional statements and the set of controls in-
creases the McFadden R2 from 0.123 to 0.136 and the
“hit” percentage—the fraction of correctly predicted
decisions—from 64.8 to 67.3.9
Model 3 tests whether there are incremental effects of
repeating statements of the same type. As indicated by
the earlier preliminary analysis, the predictive power
fully derives from whether a particular statement has
been made, and not from possible repetitions. All
repetition variables are insignificant and combined the
four add no significant explanatory power to the model
(Wald Chi2(4) = 2.76, p = 0.598). The marginal effects of
the indicator variables for whether a statement oc-
curred at least once are barely affected by the inclusion
of indicators for repetitions.
In Models 4 and 5, the variables of interest measure
the proportion of a contestant’s statements that belong
to the given category. This alternative approach as-
sumes that the importance of a particular statement
for the contestant’s overall message depends on the
number of other statements made. Model 5 includes
the full set of controls and shows that a contestant
who made explicit unconditional statements only is
43 percentage points more likely to cooperate than
a contestant who used none of the four statement types
(p < 0.001). Contestants who made implicit uncon-
ditional statements only or explicit conditional state-
ments only are, respectively, 23 percentage points and
28 percentage points more likely to cooperate (both p <
0.011). Those who made implicit conditional state-
ments only are 10 percentage points more likely to
cooperate, but this effect is only marginally significant
(p = 0.072).
Table 2. Regression Results for Statement Indicators and Proportions
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
One or more One or more One or more Two or more Proportion Proportion
Explicit unconditional 0.224*** 0.253*** 0.242*** 0.021 0.403*** 0.426***
(0.043) (0.041) (0.046) (0.061) (0.057) (0.051)
Implicit unconditional 0.101** 0.122*** 0.091** 0.074 0.214*** 0.233***
(0.042) (0.040) (0.044) (0.052) (0.046) (0.041)
Explicit conditional 0.038 0.022 0.016 0.025 0.259* 0.277**
(0.082) (0.082) (0.087) (0.168) (0.136) (0.109)
Implicit conditional −0.036 −0.019 −0.027 0.062 0.073 0.103*
(0.044) (0.043) (0.046) (0.088) (0.063) (0.057)
Controls No Yes Yes No Yes
McFadden R2 0.047 0.136 0.139 0.054 0.141
Number of clusters 284 284 284 284 284
Observations 568 568 568 568 568
Notes. The table reports the average marginal effects resulting from Logit regression analyses of contestants’ decisions to split (1) or steal (0) the
jackpot. Models 1 and 2 use indicator variables measuring whether the contestant made at least one statement that belongs to the given category.
Model 3 adds variables indicatingwhether the contestant made two or more statements belonging to the given category. Models 4 and 5 employ
variables measuring the proportion of the contestant’s statements that belong to the given category. The set of control variables in Models 2, 3,
and 5 is identical to the variables in model 6 of van den Assem et al. (2012, p. 13). It includes demographic information on age, gender, race, place
of residence, and education, and game characteristics describing the jackpot, how many times the show had been aired prior to recording, and
whether the opponent has tried to vote the participant off the show. Standard errors (in parentheses) are corrected for clustering at the episode
level.
*p <0.10; **p <0.05; ***p <0.01.
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The marginal effects differ significantly between the
four statement types (Wald Chi2(3) = 18.01, p < 0.001),
and their ranking supports the malleability hypothesis.
Pairwise tests show that explicit unconditional state-
ments have a larger marginal effect than both implicit
unconditional and implicit conditional statements
(both Wald Chi2(1) > 8.18, both one-sided p < 0.003)
and that implicit unconditional statements have a stron-
ger marginal effect than implicit conditional ones (Wald
Chi2(1) = 4.55, one-sided p = 0.016). There is no significant
difference between explicit unconditional and explicit
conditional statements (Wald Chi2(1) = 1.55, one-sided
p = 0.106) and a marginally significant difference
between explicit and implicit conditional statements
(Wald Chi2(1) = 2.24, one-sided p = 0.067).
The null hypothesis that the coefficients for implicit
unconditional, explicit conditional and implicit con-
ditional statements are jointly equal to zero is rejected
(Wald Chi2(3) = 18.41, p < 0.001). For a clean mea-
surement of the improvement of the empirical fit from
distinguishing malleable statements from empty talk,
however, Model 5 formally cannot be compared with
a model that omits the three weaker types because the
proportion of explicit unconditional statements by con-
struction is the complement of the proportion of weaker
statements. Using the model with an indicator variable
for explicit unconditional statements as the benchmark
model, Model 5 increases the McFadden R2 from 0.123
to 0.141 and the hit percentage from 64.8 to 67.3.
Table 3 shows the marginal effects for contestants’
strongest statements. Panel A assumes that implicit
unconditional statements are stronger than explicit
conditional statements, whereas panel B assumes the
reverse. Accounting for controls, explicit unconditional
statements increase the likelihood of cooperation by
approximately 40 percentage points (p< 0.001). Explicit
conditional and implicit unconditional statements have
intermediate effects between 21 and 41 percentage
points (all p < 0.011). Statements that are malleable
because they are both implicit and conditional have no
significant effect (p > 0.177).
For both rankings, the marginal effects of the four
strongest-statement categories are significantly different
(both Wald Chi2(3) > 26.38, both p < 0.001), and their
orders in terms of size again confirm the hypothesis that
more malleable statements are less predictive of coop-
erative behavior. Pairwise tests show that the marginal
effect of explicit unconditional statements is signifi-
cantly larger than that of implicit unconditional and
implicit conditional statements (allWaldChi2(1)> 16.10,
all one-sided p < 0.001). Implicit unconditional state-
ments are marginally stronger than implicit conditional
statements (Model 2: Wald Chi2(1) = 2.63, one-sided
p = 0.053; Model 4: Wald Chi2(1) = 2.79, one-sided
p = 0.047). Explicit conditional statements are not
different from explicit unconditional statements (both
Wald Chi2(1) < 1.15, both one-sided p > 0.141), but
more predictive of cooperation than implicit condi-
tional statements (Model 2: Wald Chi2(1) = 6.26, one-
sided p = 0.006; Model 4:Wald Chi2(1) = 2.53, one-sided
p = 0.056). However, the latter test results need to be
interpreted with some caution because there are only
a handful of contestants whose strongest statement
is of the explicit conditional statement type (9 or 19,
depending on the ranking).
Just as in the analyses with indicator and proportion
variables, our more fine-grained two-by-two typology
also improves the explanatory power over a simple
binary approach when contestants’ strongest state-
ments are considered. The null hypothesis that the
coefficients of the more malleable strongest-statement
variables are jointly equal to zero is rejected (both Wald
Chi2(3) > 14.64, both p < 0.003). Incorporating them
increases theMcFaddenR2 from 0.123 to 0.145 (Model 2)
Table 3. Regression Results for the Strongest Statement
Panel A: Implicit unconditional > explicit conditional
Model 1 Model 2
1. Explicit unconditional 0.357*** 0.400***
(0.059) (0.055)
2. Implicit unconditional 0.188*** 0.214***
(0.059) (0.056)
3. Explicit conditional 0.354** 0.406***
(0.165) (0.122)
4. Implicit conditional 0.084 0.103
(0.081) (0.076)
Controls No Yes
McFadden R2 0.053 0.145
Number of clusters 284 284
Observations 568 568
Panel B: Explicit conditional > implicit unconditional
Model 3 Model 4
1. Explicit unconditional 0.357*** 0.400***
(0.059) (0.055)
2. Explicit conditional 0.266** 0.285**
(0.117) (0.111)
3. Implicit unconditional 0.188*** 0.217***
(0.060) (0.056)
4. Implicit conditional 0.084 0.102
(0.081) (0.076)
Controls No Yes
McFadden R2 0.052 0.143
Number of clusters 284 284
Observations 568 568
Notes. The table reports the average marginal effects resulting from
Logit regression analyses of contestants’ decisions to split (1) or steal
(0) the jackpot. The models use indicator variables for the strongest
statement that the contestant made. Models 1 and 2 in panel A
assume that implicit unconditional statements are stronger than
explicit conditional statements, and Models 3 and 4 in panel B
assume the reverse. Other definitions are as in Table 2.
*p <0.10; **p <0.05; ***p <0.01.
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or 0.143 (Model 4) and increases the hit percentage by
from 64.8 to 66.7 (for both models).
Overall, the regression results support the typology
introduced in Section 2.3, regardless of how we con-
struct the statement variables. In addition to these main
analyses we have examined the following potential
moderator variables for the relation between state-
ments and behavior (not tabulated). First, we consid-
ered the moderating effect of gender. Recent findings
suggest that men are more willing to lie thanwomen.10
In our data, there is no evidence of such a gender
difference: the average marginal effects of statements
do not differ significantly between males and females.
Second, we investigated whether the relationships
between statements and cooperation change with
the number of episodes aired prior to the day of re-
cording. Similar to the stable degree of cooperation
over time found earlier (van den Assem et al. 2012),
contestants appear to remain equally likely to lie: all
interactions of statement variables and the number of
past transmissions are statistically insignificant. Last,
we looked at the moderating effect of jackpot size.
A meta-analysis of experiments employing stakes up
to tens of dollars suggests that the size of the stakes
barely affects people’s propensity to lie (Abeler et al.
2019). In Golden Balls, the stakes go far beyond the
stakes typically used in laboratory experiments. For
this larger range we do find some, albeit weak, evi-
dence that the credibility of statements decreases
when the amount of money involved increases: in-
teractions of statement variables and the jackpot size
are consistently negative and reach statistical signifi-
cance in a few specifications.
The remaining subsections distinguish between the
different types of implicit unconditional statements
(Section 3.3) and examine whether contestants condi-
tion their cooperative choice on the statements of their
opponent (Section 3.4).
3.3. Implicit Unconditional Statements
In the implicit unconditional category, there is a rich
variety in the kind of statements that contestants make,
whereas the other three contain relatively homogeneous
sets. Contestants imply that theywill split by (i) expressing
Figure 3. Cooperation Across Subcategories of Implicit Unconditional Statements
Note. This figure expands Figure 2(a) by splitting the category of implicit unconditional statements into six subcategories.
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a preference to do so, (ii) referring to their character,
(iii) referring to their past intention, (iv) expressing
awareness that viewers will disapprove stealing, (v) in-
dicating that half the jackpot is good enough or a lot of
money, and (vi) urging the opponent to trust them.
Figure 3 displays the average cooperation rates across
the six types, regardless of whether the contestant also
made statements from any other (sub)category. There
is considerable variation in cooperation, with character
(75%) and viewer (76%) references being the most
predictive of a split choice, followed by references to
past intentions (67%), pleas for trust (60%), preference
statements (59%), and money statements (48%).
Table 4 incorporates the subdivision of implicit
unconditional statements in the regression models.
Models 2 and 4 include the set of control variables. The
six estimated marginal effect sizes rank similar as the
average cooperation rates in Figure 3 and differ sig-
nificantly, both when we use indicator variables and
when we use proportions (both Wald Chi2(5) > 13.65,
both p< 0.018). Subdividing the implicit uncondi-
tional statements provides a notable improvement in
the empirical fit. When indicator variables are used, the
McFadden R2 increases from 0.136 to 0.153 and the hit
percentage from 67.3 to 69.2. When proportions are
used, the R2 increases from 0.141 to 0.166 and the hit
percentage from 67.3 to 68.7.
3.4. Opponent Statements
In the literature, there is considerable evidence that
people are conditionally cooperative, in the sense that
they have a preference for matching the cooperation of
others (Fischbacher et al. 2001, Frey and Meier 2004).
Contestants in Golden Balls appear to assume that their
opponents are conditionally cooperative, because they
generally try hard to signal their cooperative intention
or hide their plan to steal.We have seen that some types
of statements are clearlymore predictive of cooperation
than other statements. This raises the question whether
contestants condition their decisions on the statements
of their opponents.
Figures 4(a) and 4(b) indicate that split or steal
decisions do not depend on whether the opponent
made a particular statement or not and that repetitions
seem to be ignored. Figures 4(c) and 4(d) display the
results for the opponent’s strongest statement, using
the two possible orderings of implicit unconditional
and explicit conditional statements. Again, there seems
Table 4. Regression Results for Subcategories of Implicit Unconditional Statements
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
One or more One or more Proportion Proportion
Explicit unconditional 0.202*** 0.236*** 0.390*** 0.421***
(0.044) (0.041) (0.058) (0.051)
Implicit unconditional
Character 0.211** 0.204*** 0.745*** 0.715***
(0.082) (0.073) (0.187) (0.168)
Viewers 0.170* 0.158* 0.477** 0.437**
(0.098) (0.084) (0.215) (0.191)
Past intention 0.123** 0.134** 0.321*** 0.347***
(0.062) (0.057) (0.101) (0.089)
Preference 0.102** 0.124*** 0.231*** 0.254***
(0.050) (0.048) (0.078) (0.071)
Trust 0.044 0.045 0.248* 0.276**
(0.080) (0.074) (0.139) (0.132)
Money −0.060 −0.030 0.018 0.056
(0.044) (0.044) (0.079) (0.074)
Explicit conditional 0.061 0.042 0.267** 0.283***
(0.080) (0.080) (0.136) (0.108)
Implicit conditional −0.022 −0.007 0.078 0.106*
(0.043) (0.042) (0.063) (0.057)
Controls No Yes No Yes
McFadden R2 0.065 0.153 0.080 0.166
Number of clusters 284 284 284 284
Observations 568 568 568 568
Notes. The table reports the average marginal effects resulting from Logit regression analyses of contestants’
decisions to split (1) or steal (0) the jackpot. The category of implicit unconditional statements is split into six
subcategories. Models 1 and 2 use indicator variables measuring whether the contestant made at least one
statement that belongs to the given (sub)category.Models 3 and4 employ variablesmeasuring theproportion
of the contestant’s statements that belong to the given (sub)category. Other definitions are as in Table 2.
*p <0.10; **p <0.05; ***p <0.01.
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to be no relation between contestants’ propensity to co-
operate and the strength of their opponent’s statement.
Tables 5 and 6 present the regression results for
opponent statements. Irrespective of whether we use
indicator variables, proportions, or strongest-statement
variables, a clear picture emerges: we are unable to
reject the null hypothesis that the cooperative behavior
of contestants is unaffected by the statements of their
opponents. Virtually all explanatory power derives
from contestants’ own statements and the standard set
of control variables.11
In a similar vein, van den Assem et al. (2012) show
that contestants do not condition their behavior on
opponents’ demographic characteristics, despite the
predictive power of these. List (2006) and Oberholzer-
Gee et al. (2010) report similar null results for the first
season of a U.S. game show that resembles Golden
Balls. Oberholzer-Gee et al. (2010), however, do ob-
serve conditioning on demographics in later seasons,
suggesting that contestants learned to predict their
opponent’s behavior. In our data we find little evi-
dence that conditioning arises as more episodes were
Figure 4. Cooperation and Opponent’s Statements
Notes. Panel (a) displays the percentage of cooperators for all contestantswhose opponentmade at least one statement from a particular category
and for all contestants whose opponent limited herself to empty talk. Panel (b) displays the differences in the percentages of cooperators between
contestants whose opponent made at least two statements from a particular category and those whose opponent made only one. Panels (c) and
(d) display the percentage of cooperators for all contestants whose opponent’s strongest statement belongs to a particular category, with panel (c)
assuming that implicit unconditional statements are stronger than explicit conditional statements, and panel (d) assuming the reverse. The number
of contestants is at the bottom of each bar. Error bars depict standard errors around the mean.
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transmitted, neither on opponents’ demographics nor
on their statements (not tabulated). Belot et al. (2010)
study a Dutch show and do find some evidence that an
opponent’s voluntary promise correlates with the
contestant’s likelihood of cooperation. Their result,
however, is only marginally significant and only holds
for a specific subset of contestants. All in all, high-stakes
settings like Golden Balls thus provide little evidence
for conditionally cooperative behavior.12
At first sight, the combination of predictable be-
havior and lack of conditioning seems to be at odds
with the sizable literature on conditional cooperation.
One possible explanation is that some contestants
care about efficiency. In a weak variant of the Pris-
oner’s Dilemma, such players will probably selfishly
steal if they expect the other to split, but split if they
are convinced that the other will steal because
stealing would destroy the jackpot without any ma-
terial gain. If sufficiently many contestants are in this
category, their behavior would obfuscate the condi-
tional cooperation of others in this game. Our video
material, however, lends no support for this expla-
nation. Episodes end with snippets of interviews in
which contestants are asked to comment on their
choice and the outcome of the game. If efficiency concerns
were real, we would expect at least some of the contes-
tants who picked the split ball to claim that they expected
the other to steal. Strikingly, no single contestant who
chose split motivated her choice this way.
The likely explanation is that players with condi-
tionally cooperative preferences fail to recognize the
predictive power of their opponents’ statements. Ex-
perimental studies in which subjects were shown video
clips from Golden Balls or a similar show point in this
direction, and suggest a more general inability to
predict cooperative behavior: subjects perform at best
only marginally better than chance when they try
to predict contestants’ decisions (Belot et al. 2012,
Sylwester et al. 2012, Klein and Epley 2015).
4. Conclusions and Discussion
In this paper we depart from the conventional ap-
proach of analyzing the role of communication in
cooperative choice in a binary way. The literature
on free-form communication to date has mostly
dichotomously classified statements as either “prom-
ises” or “empty.” We hypothesize that lying aver-
sion leads defectors to prefer statements that are
malleable in terms of interpretation and allow them
to deny—to themselves or to others—that they are
Table 5. Regression Results for Opponent’s Statement Indicators and Proportions
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
One or more One or more One or more Two or more Proportion Proportion
Opponent
Explicit unconditional 0.004 0.010 0.045 −0.099 0.011 −0.016
(0.046) (0.042) (0.046) (0.065) (0.082) (0.073)
Implicit unconditional 0.008 −0.007 0.036 −0.089 0.020 −0.021
(0.043) (0.040) (0.043) (0.055) (0.067) (0.060)
Explicit conditional −0.094 −0.074 −0.075 0.042 −0.047 −0.052
(0.081) (0.073) (0.074) (0.208) (0.163) (0.156)
Implicit conditional −0.018 0.048 0.050 −0.030 −0.024 0.030
(0.045) (0.043) (0.045) (0.092) (0.075) (0.072)
Contestant
Explicit unconditional — 0.253*** 0.251*** 0.013 — 0.428***
— (0.041) (0.047) (0.062) — (0.050)
Implicit unconditional — 0.124*** 0.085* 0.089 — 0.235***
— (0.040) (0.044) (0.052) — (0.040)
Explicit conditional — 0.029 0.024 0.031 — 0.277**
— (0.080) (0.084) (0.179) — (0.108)
Implicit conditional — −0.018 −0.030 0.061 — 0.106
— (0.044) (0.046) (0.086) — (0.058)
Controls No Yes Yes No Yes
McFadden R2 0.002 0.139 0.150 0.001 0.142
Number of clusters 284 284 284 284 284
Observations 568 568 568 568 568
Notes. The table reports the average marginal effects resulting from Logit regression analyses of contestants’ decisions to split (1) or steal (0) the
jackpot.Models 1 and 2 use indicator variablesmeasuringwhether the contestant or her opponent made at least one statement that belongs to the
given category. Model 3 adds variables indicating whether the contestant or her opponent made two or more statements belonging to the given
category. Models 4 and 5 employ variables measuring the proportion of the contestant’s statements or the proportion of her opponent’s
statements that belong to the given category. Other definitions are as in Table 2.
*p <0.10; **p <0.05; ***p <0.01.
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lying. Cooperators do not have such a preference, and,
as a consequence, certain types of statements will be
more indicative of cooperation than others.
We propose a typology that classifies statements
according to two dimensions. This typology discrimi-
nates between statements that explicitly promise that
the individual will cooperate and statements that only
implicitly signal that she will do so, and between
statements that do not carry any element of condi-
tionality on the opponent’s split or steal decision and
statements that do carry such an element. We argue
that explicit and unconditional statements are less
malleable than implicit or conditional statements.
We have empirically examined the predictive power
of the different types of statements using the British TV
game show Golden Balls, where two contestants play a
variant on the Prisoner’s Dilemma with high stakes and
free-form preplay communication. In line with the
malleability hypothesis, our data show that explicit
unconditional statements are associated with the highest
likelihood of cooperation. Statements that either carry an
element of conditionality or implicitness are generally
associated with a moderate likelihood of cooperation.
There is no clear reason to deem implicit unconditional
statements more malleable than explicit conditional
statements or vice versa, and in our data, there is no
consistent evidence of such a difference. Last, con-
testants who make statements that are both condi-
tional and implicit and contestants who do not make
any statements related to their choice have the lowest
rate of cooperation.
Within the category of implicit unconditional state-
ments, we observe six different subcategories. These
subcategories turn out to predict cooperation to varying
degrees. The differences are not captured by our ty-
pology, but they do make intuitive sense. The co-
operation rate is relatively high for contestants who
referred to their character, to viewers’ disapproval of
defecting, or to their past intention. Character state-
ments link the cooperative choice to the contestant’s
personality and values, which reveals awareness of
and possibly amplifies the negative effects of defec-
tion on her self-concept and reputation. References to
viewers specifically signal a contestant’s reputation
concerns. The high rate after past intention statements
can be explained by people’s desire to be and appear
consistent (Cialdini 1984; Falk and Zimmermann 2017,
2018).
In spite of the predictive power, contestants do not
condition their choice on their opponents’ statements.
This absence of conditioning implies that contestants
either do not have a preference for matching the other’s
choice or cannot or do not make accurate assessments.
The former explanation is not very likely given the
evidence that contestants systematically reciprocate
Table 6. Regression Results for the Opponent’s Strongest
Statement
Panel A: Implicit unconditional > explicit conditional
Model 1 Model 2
Opponent
1. Explicit unconditional 0.005 −0.006
(0.066) (0.060)
2. Implicit unconditional 0.016 −0.007
(0.063) (0.058)
3. Explicit conditional 0.146 0.053
(0.167) (0.186)
4. Implicit conditional −0.055 −0.045
(0.085) (0.078)
Contestant
1. Explicit unconditional — 0.396***
— (0.055)
2. Implicit unconditional — 0.211***
— (0.056)
3. Explicit conditional — 0.410***
— (0.120)
4. Implicit conditional — 0.097
— (0.076)
Controls No Yes
McFadden R2 0.002 0.145
Observations 284 284
Clusters 568 568
Panel B: Explicit conditional > implicit unconditional
Model 3 Model 4
Opponent
1. Explicit unconditional 0.005 0.000
(0.066) (0.060)
2. Explicit conditional −0.047 −0.104
(0.119) (0.106)
3. Implicit unconditional 0.029 0.010
(0.063) (0.059)
4. Implicit conditional −0.055 −0.040
(0.085) (0.078)
Contestant
1. Explicit unconditional — 0.399***
— (0.055)
2. Explicit conditional — 0.292***
— (0.105)
3. Implicit unconditional — 0.215***
— (0.056)
4. Implicit conditional — 0.102
— (0.076)
Controls No Yes
McFadden R2 0.002 0.145
Observations 284 284
Clusters 568 568
Notes. The table reports the average marginal effects resulting from
Logit regression analyses of contestants’ decisions to split (1) or steal
(0) the jackpot. The models use indicator variables for the strongest
statement that the contestant or her opponent made. Models 1 and 2
in panel A assume that implicit unconditional statements are stronger
than explicit conditional statements, and Models 3 and 4 in panel B
assume the reverse. Other definitions are as in Table 2.
*p <0.10; **p <0.05; ***p <0.01.
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opponents’ earlier attempts to vote them off the show
(van den Assem et al. 2012) and given contestants’
frequent attempts to convince their opponents of
their own cooperative intent. The latter explanation
corresponds with experimental findings on people’s
ability to predict others’ cooperative intentions. These
findings are somewhatmixed, but the general picture is
that forecasts are rather poor (Dawes et al. 1977, Frank
et al. 1993, Brosig 2002, Belot et al. 2010, Sylwester et al.
2012, Klein and Epley 2015, He et al. 2017).
For the predictive power of malleability to hold, it is
not required that people first decide whether they will
cooperate and only then choose their statements ac-
cordingly. Malleability also predicts cooperation if
people are undecidedwhen they enter the conversation
and base their decision on the statements they made.
As a consequence of lying aversion, the option of
stealing is costlier and thus less appealing for contes-
tants whose statements were less malleable.
Our empirical results point out that our two-by-two
typology provides a useful framework for categorizing
the wide set of possible statements in free-form com-
munication. We have applied it in the specific context
of a variant on the Prisoner’s Dilemma, but it can
straightforwardly be used for a wider class of non-
cooperative games.
A special feature of our field setting is that decisions
are highly public, which may have amplified con-
testants’ concerns about their reputation as a reliable
person. At the same time, another special feature is
that contestants are participating in what can be
perceived as a “game,” and lying in this game can
potentially be seen as an inherent and unobjectionable
element (Battigalli et al. 2013). In everyday life, most
interactions are also public to some extent, and even in
private interactions, people may worry about repu-
tational repercussions of deceit because of gossip.
Future experimental work could apply the typology
to more anonymous conditions.
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Appendix. Definitions of Statement Categories
and Examples
A.1. Explicit Unconditional
Definition: A statement is explicit unconditional (EU) if it
(i) explicitly expresses that the contestant will choose split or
not choose steal and (ii) carries no element of conditionality
on the opponent’s split or steal decision.
Examples: “I will split”; “I will not steal”; “I am going to split”;
“I am going to pick up the split ball”; “There is no way I am
going to pick the steal ball”; “Mysplit ball is right there, and I am
going to pick that ball up”; “I will not take it from you.”
Nonexamples: “You know I am going to pick up the split
ball”; “I told you before that I am going to split”; “You know
I am going to pick up the split ball” (these statements are in
the IU Plea for trust category).
A.2. Implicit Unconditional
Definition: A statement is implicit unconditional (IU) if it
(i) does not explicitly express that the contestant will choose
split or not choose steal but signals this through an in-
dication of her preference (see IU preference), a reference to
her character (see IU character), a reference to a past in-
tention (see IU past intention), an expression of concern for
viewers’ or any other’s judgment (see IU viewers), the
opinion that half the jackpot is good or enough for her (see
IU money), or because it urges her opponent to trust her (see
IU plea for trust), and (ii) carries no element of conditionality
on the opponent’s split or steal decision.
A.2.1. IU Preference. Definition: IU preference statements
signal that the contestant will choose split or not choose steal
by expressing her current desire or intention to choose split,
disapproval of stealing, or opinion that she should or feels
obliged to choose split.
Examples: “I want to split with you”; “I am happy to split”;
“I have got to split”; “I need to split”; “There is no need to be
greedy and take everything homewithme”; “I wouldn’t steal”
(this is quite close to IU character, but it is not the same as
“I couldn’t steal”;we interpret this statement as “Iwouldn’twant
to steal”); “I would hate to steal and leave you empty-handed”;
“Iwouldn’t feel goodwalking awaywith all themoney”; “I think
itwould be stupid to steal”; “I think it’s only fair to split”; “I don’t
want you to walk away with nothing”; “I would feel stupid
stealing”; “Stealing is not worth losing your integrity over”;
“I intend to split”; “I plan to split”; “My intention is to
choose split”; “There is no point in being greedy”; “There is
no point in stealing”; “It would be silly not to split”; “I think it is
fair to share”; “I want to walk away with my integrity intact.”
Nonexample: “I think I might split.”
A.2.2. IU Character. Definition: IU character statements
signal that the contestant will choose split or not choose steal
through a reference to her character, nature, or general in-
ability to steal.
Examples: “I am not the kind of person who steals”; “My
conscience will not allow me to steal”; “I honestly do not
think that I can steal”; “I couldn’t steal”; “I am a splitter”
(saying “I am the kind of person who splits”); “Stealing is not
an option for me”; “I am not greedy.”
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Nonexamples: “I have been honest throughout the game”
(description of own honesty in the past); “I am an honest
person” (reference to honesty, which relates to what is being
said and not to what is being done); “I cannot go home and
look my eight year old in the eye and say that I stole it from
another eight year old kid” (the “cannot steal” aspect is due
to an other’s judgment; this statement is in the IU Viewers
category); “I am a man of my word.”
A.2.3. IU Past Intention. Definition: IU past intention state-
ments signal that the contestant will choose split or not choose
steal through a reference to her past intention or desire to choose
split, or to her intention or desire all along to choose split.
Examples: “I came here to split”; “I came here with the
intention to split”; “I have alwayswanted to split”; “Mygame
plan has always been to split”; “I am here to split” (refers to
the contestant’s plan to choose split all along).
Nonexamples: “I came here to play an honest game” (honesty
does not necessarily mean splitting); “I promised my class that
if I came to this stage I would split the money” (although the
statement refers to the past, the critical part relates to the judg-
ment of others; this statement is in the IU viewers category).
A.2.4. IU Viewers. Definition: IU viewers statements signal
that the contestant will choose split or not choose steal by
expressing her awareness or worry that viewers will disap-
prove stealing or by referring to somebody else or some other
people who want her to split.
Examples: “If I stole off you, this entire audiencewould lynch
me”; “There is no way I am going to do you over on national
TV”; “I cannot steal on TV”; “I cannot steal because my mom
will be ashamed of me”; “I told my wife before coming on the
show that I would split”; “I couldn’t face anybody if I stole”;
“Everyone who knows me would be disgusted”; “I just think
stealing would look so greedy you know” (it is implied that
stealing would look greedy to others); “I promised my class
that if I came to this stage I would split the money”; “Mymom
is watching. She told me to finish this with integrity”; “My son
told me that I have got to split.”
Nonexamples: “My kids are watching”; “My entire family is
watching” (mere descriptions of the situation, it is not suf-
ficiently clear whether these people want the contestant to
split or not).
A.2.5. IU Money. Definition: IU money statements signal
that the contestant will choose split or not choose steal by
expressing her feeling or opinion that half of the jackpot is
a lot of money or good enough for her.
Examples: “I will be delighted to go home with half the
jackpot”; “If I went home with 10,000 pounds, I would be
ecstatic” (jackpot: £20,000); “10,000 pounds would make
a difference” (jackpot: £20,000); “30,000 pounds is enough”
(jackpot: £60,000); “I am looking to go home with 3,800
pounds” (interpreted as “I want to go home with 3,800
pounds”; jackpot: £7,600); “I want half the jackpot”; “I want
you to have half the jackpot.”
Nonexample: “Half the jackpot is better than nothing”
(doesn’t mean it is good enough).
A.2.6. IU Plea for Trust. Definition: IU Plea for trust
statements signal that the contestant will choose split or not
choose steal by urging or pleading with the opponent to trust
her or by indicating that the opponent can expect her to
choose split.
Examples: “You can trust me”; “Trust me”; “I will not let you
down”; “I will not rip you off” (indirectly saying that the
opponent can have trust); “I won’t be greedy” (interpreted as
“Trust me, I won’t be greedy”); “There is no way I am going to
do you over” (indirectly saying that the opponent can have
trust); “You know I am going to pick up the split ball”
(interpreted as “you should know that I amgoing to pick up the
split ball”); “I told youbefore that I amgoing to split” (indirectly
indicating that the opponent has her word); “You have nothing
to worry about”; “I guaranteed you in the last round that if you
took me with I would split”; “You are going home with some
money”; “I give you my word”; “You have my word.”
Nonexamples: “I don’t want to let you down” (interpreted
as “I don’t want to steal”; this statement is in the IU Preference
category); “I wouldn’t turn on you” (interpreted as “I would
not want to turn on you”; this statement is in the IU Pref-
erence category); “I am a man of my word.”
A.3. Explicit Conditional
Definition: A statement is explicit conditional (EC) if it
(i) explicitly expresses that the contestant(s) will choose split
or not choose steal, and (ii) carries an element of condition-
ality on the opponent’s split or steal decision through an if-
clause or a reference to the joint action.
Examples: “I will split if you split”; “I will split if you can
assure me that you won’t let me down”; “We will split to-
gether”; “You and I will both split”; “I think you are going to
do the right thing and share the money with me, and I am
going to do the right thing and share the money with you”;
“We are going to split it”; “I will steal if I think you are going
to steal.”
A.4. Implicit Conditional
Definition: A statement is implicit conditional (IC) if it (i) does
not explicitly express that the contestant(s) will choose split or
not choose steal but signals it through an indication of
a preference for both splitting, a reference to both contestants’
past intentions to split, a reference to viewers’ or any other’s
judgment about the joint choice or outcome, the opinion that
half the jackpot is good or enough for both, or because it urges
for mutual trust, and (ii) carries an element of conditionality
on the opponent’s split or steal decision through an if-clause
or a reference to the joint action.
Examples: “I am willing to choose split if you will split”; “If
you split with me, I am there for you all the way”; “We need
to split the money”; “We should both go away with some-
thing”; “I would like us to split”; “We have to split”; “Let’s
split”; “We said from the start that we would split”; “I think it
should be a split” (split most likely refers to the joint outcome
in this case); “I want you to feel the same as me when we go
home”; “I think it is really awful if one of us stole”; “I want to
split, and I would love for you to do the same for me”; “I want
to split, but I want to be sure you’ll split with me”; “On
national TV, whoever backed out is terrible”; “We need to
trust each other now”; “I trust you and you trust me”; “I want
you and me to have half the jackpot”; “We have got the
money in our bank accounts” (conditional variant of “you are
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going home with some money”); “We will go home happy”;
“Wemight as well split”; “Let’s not be greedy”; “Wewill look
silly if we steal” (interpreted as “We should split”); “It is just
pure greed if we steal” (interpreted as “We should split”);
“Half each.”
Nonexamples: “To get this far, and to both risk saying steal
and going home with nothing, I would be absolutely gutted”
(this is an opinion about both choosing steal, which is not the
same as an opinion about both choosing split); “If we both
steal, we both walk away with nothing” (description of the
game); “If we split, we both walk away with 25,000” (de-
scription of the game); “I would like to end the show on
a good note” (can mean anything); “525 pounds each” (de-
scribes half the jackpot, not the outcome).
Endnotes
1Even in experiments where subjects perform one-shot tasks under
anonymous conditions, reputation concerns cannot be ruled out
entirely, because subjects are normally well aware that their choices
are recorded and scrutinized (Levitt and List 2007).
2Game show data have been widely used to study, for example,
individual decision-making under risk (Gertner 1993, Metrick 1995,
Beetsma and Schotman 2001, Post et al. 2008, Hartley et al. 2014),
strategic decision-making (Bennett and Hickman 1993, Berk et al.
1996, Tenorio and Cason 2002), discrimination (Levitt 2004,
Antonovics et al. 2005), cooperative behavior (List 2004, 2006; Belot
et al. 2010; Oberholzer-Gee et al. 2010; van den Assem et al. 2012), and
bargaining (van Dolder et al. 2015).
3The reluctance to lie also depends on the type of deception.
Lundquist et al. (2009) and Hilbig and Hessler (2013) show that
people rather tell small lies than big lies. Gneezy (2005) and Erat and
Gneezy (2012) find that people care about the consequences of a lie
both for themselves and for others: the more someone can gain from
lying, the more likely she is to lie, and the more a lie hurts the other,
the less likely she is to lie. Spranca et al. (1991) demonstrate that
people regard deception by omission as less immoral than deception
through commission.
4 In the present paper, 215 contestants made one or more explicit
unconditional statements. Out of those, 210 (98%) were assigned
a value of one for the promise variable in the previous paper. The
small difference can be attributed to previous coding errors. Out of
the 305 contestants in the present paper whowere assigned a value of
one for the promise variable in the previous paper, 210 (69%) made
one or more explicit unconditional statements. Two-thirds of the
difference (63/95) can be ascribed to the different treatment of
statements that have no meaning on their own, and the remainder to
the present paper’s strict coding rules leaving little room for sub-
jective interpretation.
5 Formally, malleability can also derive from conditionality on other
unknowns, as long as the contestant can reasonably claim ignorance
about whether the condition is satisfied until after she made her
choice. In Golden Balls, however, conditional statements exclusively
relate to the opponent’s split or steal decision.
6Belot et al. (2010) find that game show contestants are indeed more
likely to stick to a promise if it was made voluntarily than if it was
elicited by a question from the host.
7Video clips of this and many other episodes are widely available on
the internet, for example, through YouTube.
8 In most cases, the conditionality derives from a reference to the joint
action. Only nine explicit conditional statements and eight implicit
conditional statements are through an if-clause.
9 For comparison: the intercept-only model has a hit percentage of
52.5.
10Both Dreber and Johannesson (2008) and Erat and Gneezy
(2012) find that men are more willing to lie in sender-receiver
games than women, whereas Childs (2012) and Gylfason et al.
(2013) find no significant difference. Abeler et al. (2019) and
Capraro (2018) perform a meta-analysis of lying experiments and
conclude that men lie more than women.
11Distinguishing between the six different types of implicit un-
conditional statements made by the opponent adds no significant
explanatory power (not tabulated).
12We have in addition investigated the behavior of contestants for
whom there is a particular reason to believe that they are condi-
tionally cooperative. Episodes contain fragments of private in-
terviews that individual contestants had with the producer, in which
they announce their game plan. We found no evidence that con-
testants who indicated that their decision depends on their opponent
cooperate more when their opponent’s demographics or statements
aremore indicative of cooperation. Similarly, we found little evidence
of conditioning among contestants who made (explicit or implicit)
conditional statements. The only exception is that these contestants
are more likely to cooperate when their opponent made an explicit
unconditional statement. Note, however, that this evidence for
conditional cooperation also aligns with our malleability hypothesis,
because such an unmalleable statement by the opponent makes it
harder for a contestant whomade a conditional statement to steal and
then deny that she has lied. Last, we could not find any evidence that
contestants are matching their opponents’ actual choice, neither for
the two types of contestants who indicated to be conditionally co-
operative nor for the full sample.
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